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Kiyozawa Manshi and the Meaning 
of Buddhist Ethics
Mark L. Blum
Kiyozawa Manshi 1863-1903, is probably best remembered
today as the first president of what is now Otani University in Kyoto 
and a reformer of the Shinshfi Buddhist faith in late Meiji Japan. He 
was responsible for presenting a new existential grounding of Shinshu 
thought in the context of modem social conditions. His legacy has 
become so pervasive that most modem studies of Shinshfi begin with 
his thought. I will attempt to offer a brief glimpse into the motivation 
that led him, one of the brightest students in his class at Tokyo Univer­
sity, to abandon a potentially successful career in academics or govern­
ment service for the often thankless task of crusader for genuine reli­
gious ethics.
Kiyozawa himself categorized the Meiji period into three areas of 
intellectual focus: philosophy (1881-1890), ethics (1890-1898) and 
religion (1898-1903).1 His own writings, of course, reflect these divi­
sions, but he is also saying something about his peers. For his religious 
concerns as expressed in the final phase of his work should be seen, in 
fact, as spearheading a shift in values in the intellectual community of 
urban Japan around the turn of this century. Unfortunately, he suc­
cumbed to tuberculosis at the young age of 41 before his ideas had 
much impact beyond the academic-religious community.
1 Yoshida KyOichi, Kiyozawa Manshi (Yoshikawa KObunkan, 1961). Yoshida sup­
plies the time frame only for the first period, and does not quote the source of his infor­
mation. I have deduced the other two periods from my own survey of Kiyozawa’s 
writings. It should be remembered that Kiyozawa himself died in June, 1903.
Above all, Kiyozawa was a religious thinker, but one of his great 
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appeals lay in his personal commitment to the verification of 
philosophical insight through practice, i.e., meditation. There is no 
question that he found ample precedent for this in his study of the 
Agamas, texts from the earliest strata of Buddhist literature. Here we 
have an extremely rational Buddha as teacher, instructing by example, 
convincing with logic, and demanding of his disciples great dedication 
to meditation as the central path to truth. Yet Kiyozawa was academi­
cally trained in Western philosophy while being ordained in the Shin- 
shu sect of Buddhism which centers on faith as the vehicle for libera­
tion. How these seemingly contradictory approaches were coherently 
integrated into an ethical imperative is the internal, spiritual story of 
Kiyozawa Manshi. In the following pages I will try to present a short 
outline of what I think are the significant events in Kiyozawa’s life, his 
status within the philosophical climate of Meiji Japan, and finally his 
somewhat unorthodox point of view on religion and ethics that was 
shaped in part by these factors.
It is a tradition in Buddhism that every thinker holds three texts in 
highest esteem. Let us begin our discussion of Kiyozawa Manshi by 
outlining his triad (J. sambukyb S3ME): the Agamas mentioned above, 
the work of the Greek philosopher Epictetus, and TannishO of 
Shinran. Kiyozawa’s tuberculosis was first diagnosed at the age of 35, 
and while convalescing he began to read the Agamas of the Sar- 
vastivadin school in their Chinese translations.2 Heretofore largely ig­
nored in Japan because of their designation as Hinayana (i.e., inferior) 
scriptures, Kiyozawa was immediately struck by the rich religious in­
sight revealed in the dialogues between Sakyamuni Buddha and his 
disciples. Herein Kiyozawa confronted the central issue of avidya, a 
sort of primal ignorance, in early Buddhism, and the doctrine that all 
suffering stems from conceptual delusion rooted in this deep-seated ig­
norance about oneself and the world that lies at the base of all we think 
and do. He was impressed with the commitment to the spiritual path 
evidenced by Buddha’s group, demanding that one turn one’s back on
2 These roughly correspond to the Pali NikSyas of the TheravSdin school which 
have been translated by the Pali Text Society. The Agamas, with fragmentary excep­
tion, remain largely untranslated today. It is at this time that Kiyozawa composed 
“Anatman is the Basis for Contemporary Morality” (Taniuchi Seijun, ed.» Kiyozawa 
Manshi no KenkyQ [Kyoto: Higashi Honganji Kydkakenkyflsho, 19571, p. 274).
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filial piety, patriotism, morality and even philosophy.3 Later he wrote 
to a friend that he could not remember wetting his sleeves as much as at 
that time. A year after his study of the A gam as y he received a copy of 
the Stoic philosopher Epictetus from his disciple Akegarasu Haya 
ft, and again Kiyozawa was deeply moved. Originally a slave and 
physically handicapped from the experience, Epictetus insisted on 
spiritual independence from secular power, a theme often seen in 
Kiyozawa’s own writings. Epictetus also believed that pain originates 
from the unenlightened part of oneself and awaits illumination by the 
knowledgeable part (much like the Abhidharma notion in early Bud­
dhism that avidya is to be gradually erased by vidyO), and that respon­
sibility for its removal is totally internal.4 The ideal of Socrates fearless­
ly facing death, echoed in Plato and the later Stoics, clearly helped 
Kiyozawa confront his terminal illness, and the message of Epictetus 
must also have strengthened his resolve to improve himself through 
meditation. But, we might wonder how much of this Stoic asceticism is 
also reflected in Kiyozawa’s impatience with the sedentary life needed 
for his recuperation as well as in the “minimum possible” life-style he 
later developed which surely contributed to his early death.
’ Cf. Kiyozawa’s essay entitled “ShQkyOteki Shinnen no Hissu Joken” (“The 
Necessary Conditions of Religious Faith”) in Kiyozawa Manshi Zensha (The Collected 
Works of Kiyozawa Manshi), cd. Akegarasu Haya and Nishimura Miyake, 8 vols. 
(Kyoto: HOzOkan, 1953-56), vol. 6, p. 14]ff.; hereafter all citations of Kiyozawa’s 
writings are from the Zensha.
* Clearly, there is much thought of a similar nature in the antimaterialistic phase of 
the Stoics and early Buddhism. The former’s disdain of nationalistic identification cor­
responds to the Buddhist notion that the sangha is above society and its laws; both 
uphold the ideal of the solitary ascetic and describe his spiritual goals in negational ex­
pressions such as, in the case of the Stoics: “Athens is beautiful. Yes, but happiness is 
far more beautiful—freedom from passion and disturbance, the sense that your affairs 
depend on no one” (from Bertrand Russell: A History of Western Philosophy, p. 264).
5 That is, the theory of two truths, the idealism of Yogflc&ra, the anti-conceptual
Shinran’s thought as recorded in the TannishO by Yuien is known 
now as a centerpiece of Shin Buddhist (Shinshfl) thought, but in fact 
the popularity of this text today can be traced directly back to its 
“discovery” by Kiyozawa Manshi. In connection with the TannishO 
and Shinran’s thought in general, it should be mentioned that, as the 
lone Mahayflna thinker in Kiyozawa’s doctrinal threesome, Shinran 
represents all mainstream Mahayana philosophical currents.5 Specific
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to Shinrail are his notions of the enlightenment of faith (shinjin »&) as 
the central religious issue; the mutual exclusion of self-centered, self­
motivated practice (Jiriki d jj) and “other”-centered practice (tariki ffi, 
#); and the expunging of the traditional life-style within monastic com­
munities (S., sangha) for priests, urging instead that they live in the 
secular world yet remain “neither monk nor layman” (hisO hizoku
Kiyozawa is clearly indebted to Shinran in ways beyond calcula­
tion, but what begs further investigation is precisely how Kiyozawa 
differed from the orthodox policies expounded by the Higashi Hongan- 
ji Shinshu church of his time—an area of study unfortunately beyond 
the limits of this paper. Kiyozawa’s religious understanding was la­
belled heterodox (i-anjin by the church establishment, yet he
himself became a founder of a new lineage of Shinshfl thought, based 
upon the academic study of Shinran’s ideas, that continues to this day. 
In any case, there seems little doubt that Kiyozawa is very close to 
Shinran on points of Shinshu doctrine: the rejection of the imperative 
of living in a monastic community, the dynamic of jiriki practice being 
subjugated by tariki experience, and maintaining an attitude which con­
fronts one’s ignorance while affirming one’s liberation by means of the 
“Other Power” as a model expressing the pan-Mahayftna ideal of 
nirvana = samsOra, enlightenment = defilement.
Turning to the events of Kiyozawa’s life, it is probably significant for 
his free-thinking views on Shinshu doctrine that he did not become a 
priest through hereditary obligation. Beginning with the precedent 
established by Shinran in the thirteenth century, the Shinshu 
priesthood did not require celibacy, resulting in a hereditary transmis­
sion. However, like many other significant figures in the Meiji period, 
Kiyozawa was actually born into a lower-ranking samurai family. He 
was raised in the eastern part of the Nagoya metropolis, an area in fact 
originally enfeoffed to the bakufu ruling family. Thus we can probably 
assume a strong influence by the prevailing Neo-Confucian samurai 
values of the late Tokugawa period: self-discipline, frugality and pro­
priety in human relations. But Kiyozawa’s neighborhood was also a 
stronghold of lay Shinshu belief, and Kiyozawa seems to have been par­
ticularly touched by his own mother’s piety.
dialectic of Mfldhyamika, the nirvftna = saqisAra equation of Prajfifi-pAramita, the in­
terpenetrating organic cosmology of the Avatarpsaka (J. Kegon) sutra, etc.
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Always an excellent student in school, he was placed in a preliminary 
medical school by his father at the age of 15. Though he achieved high 
marks, he quit in the same year, apparently due to a lack of motiva­
tion. It was at this time, when urged by a local priest,6 that Kiyozawa 
chose to enter the religious path as a solution to his career quandary. 
He later wrote of this period as one in which he had little actual 
religious motivation, but found himself attracted to the course of study 
offered by the Honganji. He was ordained at the age of 15 in 1878, mov­
ing to Kyoto to study at the Honganji high school. In 1883 he entered 
Tokyo University in humanities and lost no time in choosing to focus 
on the study of Western philosophy. Under E. F. Fenellosa, the first 
foreign professor of philosophy in Japan, he eagerly pursued Hegel, 
Spinoza, Mill and Spencer. On graduation, he continued into graduate 
school in religious studies, attracted strongly to Hegel (Fenellosa’s own 
philosophy was a mixture of Hegel and Spinoza).
4 RyQge KOon
7 From Hegel he also adopted the concepts of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis:
His rejection of utilitarianism for the idealism of Hegel certainly 
foreshadows his later moral and ethical alienation from the Meiji social 
and political propaganda of “enrich the nation and strengthen the 
armed forces” (Jukoku kyOhei *S&£). Philosophically, Hegel was 
significant for Kiyozawa because here he found the notion of an in­
finite dimension of Reason which Kiyozawa then extended to the Pure 
Land Buddhist concept of anjin (religious assurance, or literally, 
“pacified mind”). It was his understanding that, more than merely a 
phrase from traditional doctrine, anjin was a psychological experience 
based in a universal logos. At this time, Kiyozawa also developed a 
Hegelian-like organic view of the universe as an infinite whole com­
posed of finite parts.7 Yet he was sophisticated enough to see the 
fallacy in Hegel's odd belief in the supreme power and glory of the 
state, something noteworthy because his study was taking place when 
the sociopolitical ethic surrounding Kiyozawa in fact professed the 
same ideals as those put forth by Hegel. Instead, he seems to have 
cleverly maintained Hegel’s metaphysical model as a means of resisting 
the increasing politicization of values by the state in Japan in the 1880s 
and 1890s by focusing on the greater significance of universals.
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His writings at this time also express a deep self-reflection on the Bud­
dhist concept of affliction by ignorance (S. klesa, J. bon nd ®ta), and 
the importance of the traditional monastic rules of discipline. To some 
degree we can attribute the strength of his concern to his having 
entered the priesthood as a teenager. It is known, for example, that he 
was teased for his seriousness by his high school classmates who had all 
grown up in temples and had become somewhat blas6 about their Bud­
dhism; they gave him the nickname “Bishop.” But it is clear that 
Kiyozawa’s spiritual concerns became the dominant motivating force 
in his life at some point during his study while at Tokyo University, for 
he forsook a promising academic career to work instead for the reform 
and revitalization of his church. Academically, Kiyozawa Manshi 
could have become Japan’s first scholar to establish a comprehensive 
philosophy based on Western models; indeed one of his classmates 
wrote, “Of the 12 or 13 of us, Manshi was the only one who could rise 
to the highest position in something, the only one who would leave 
something behind after his death besides a tombstone.”8 Nishida 
KitarO, who did go on to become Japan's first modern philosopher, 
remarked: “Originally there were many people in Japan who studied 
philosophy, but the only people whom we should really call ‘philos­
ophers’ were Onishi Hajime and my own Kiyozawa Manshi.”9
1 As quoted in Yoshida, p. 71.
9 ibid., p. I. Cf. pp. 30-31 where Yoshida points out that Nishida was close to the 
Seishinshugi movement and contributed an article to the movement's journal 
Seishinkai entitled “Knowledge and Love" which also appeared in his famous A Study 
of Good. Yoshida feels Kiyozawa had a more direct philosophical influence on Nishida 
than D. T. Suzuki.
Upon finishing his graduate program, Kiyozawa immediately began 
working within the Higashi Honganji educational system, an institu­
tion whose reform will occupy him until his death. He told others he 
owed the church his labor because it educated him despite his poverty, 
but Kiyozawa conceived of his obligation in a way that would infuriate 
the slow-moving church hierarchy. His efforts to reform the manner in 
which young priests were educated also became a vehicle for expressing 
his philosophical and religious ideas, because the major issue in his 
struggle with the church was the content of Shinshu doctrine and what 
it implied ethically. From his first positions at the age of 26 as ad-
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ministrator and instructor, he began to petition, speak out publicly, 
and lobby for higher educational standards. Unfortunately, at this 
time the Higashi Honganji organization had huge debts to repay and 
was committed to a major reconstruction project of one of its main 
temples in Kyoto. Coupled with a reticence to alter the feudalistic rela­
tions between church and lay supporters remaining nearly intact from 
the Tokugawa period, this financial burden kept the church’s hands 
tied whenever Kiyozawa and his idealistic followers suggested major 
changes in curriculum, academic requirements, etc. In 1897, while 
leading (at the age of 35) what had become a nationwide cause cttebre 
in the newspapers10 to accept a number of changes within the church 
and its institutions, including democratic choice of the next head ad­
ministrator and objective principles of research for all Buddhist doc­
trine, Kiyozawa Manshi was censured11 by his church.
10 High school and college students who signed petitions in support of the movement 
were expelled by church administrator Atsumi Kaien. Inoue EnryO and NanjO Fumio 
also supported Kiyozawa who at one point managed to assemble 2500 believers in Kyo­
to at a conference of his own design to discuss educational goals and policy.
" The term used wasjomei referring at least to removal from office, but whose 
exact ramifications are still unclear to me.
12 Yoshida, p. 144.
13 ibid.
The censure was lifted one year later, and merely three years after its 
onset, changes in the leadership of the Honganji resulted in Kiyozawa 
being named president of the reformed (and to be rebuilt) Shinsha Uni­
versity, the forerunner of present day Otani University. Although this 
represented a degree of recognition of the value of his ideals by the Ota- 
ni-ha organization, his stay in this position was short-lived. Barely a 
year after his appointment, Kiyozawa resigned over yet another ideo­
logical conflict. The issue this time was a debate within the university 
over the need for secular accreditation of the school, with the majority 
of the students demanding certification of their faculty by the Ministry 
of Education. Kiyozawa refused to give in to what he clearly saw as 
secular encroachment upon his religious institution, saying: “This is 
out of the question. Our students are here only to deal with purely 
religious questions.”12 13Kiyozawa by this time had become undeniably 
cynical about the real rewards of the values of materialism and its 
accompanying social movements that he saw in Japan toward mono-
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polistic capitalism and authoritarianism; he had no desire to watch 
Shinshu University turn into another of the “worldly universities 
set up for those seeking bread and fame.”13 Although the cries of pro­
test were only for the ouster of his administrator, Sekine J inn <5, he 
himself also resigned, for the policies were indeed his own.14 *
14 Campaigns were immediately formed among students to retain Kiyozawa, but he 
refused to be persuaded to return to his position.
” It is considered one of the two progressive journals which had the greatest impact 
on the Buddhist world in Japan in this period. The other was ShinbukkyO
16 It remains unclear to the author whether or not Kiyozawa’s choice of the name 
Seishinshugi reflected a conscious translation from the Western word, Spiritualism. 
Although the meaning of the latter has varied in different contexts, we can be certain 
that Kiyozawa at least was not drawing on the late nineteenth century movement center­
ing around communication with the dead. However, the idealist movement called by 
this name may have influenced Kiyozawa, given an essay he wrote entitled, “Seishin­
shugi to SeijO” (“Seishinshugi and Idealism”).
These experiences, while seemingly disastrous for his career, in fact 
only served to strengthen Kiyozawa’s resolve toward the significance of 
his ideals. They also produced through the years a loyal group of 
young intellectuals who supported his causes. The last such group 
before Kiyozawa’s death was called the Kdkddd, meaning ‘The Cave 
of Direct, Intuitive Perception,’ and together they produced the last 
and best known in a string of publications initiated by Kiyozawa called 
Seishinkai or ‘The Realm of the Spirit.’
Seishinkai came out monthly with essays by Kiyozawa and others in 
the Kdkddd. Often considered blasphemous within the traditional Bud­
dhist world, Seishinkai had a tremendous impact among intellectuals at 
the time.13 Many of Japan’s leading prewar Buddhist scholars emerged 
from this group, including Tokiwa Daijd, Murakami Senshd, Sasaki 
Gesshd, Akanuma Chizen, Kaneko Daiei, and Soga RyOjin. Indeed, 
one of the commonly echoed praises of Kiyozawa Manshi heard today 
centers on his heroic struggle to purge Buddhist thought, especially 
Shinran’s, of much of the doctrinal ossification that had all but 
obscured its spiritual message to the modern world. The journal itself 
was so named for a movement known as Seishinshugi the
name given to the ideology of the KOkOdO.16 In a small rented house in 
Tokyo that became their ‘cave’, Kiyozawa lived with a number of his 
followers in a sparse, rather ascetic life-style. Their motto, hung in the
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central hallway, read, “Without bitterness toward heaven, without 
seeking among men.” Tokiwa Daijd, the great Tendai scholar, later 
remarked that “the life-style of the ‘cave’ made it seem as if the sangha 
of ancient times had appeared right before your eyes.”17 Although 
Kiyozawa was only able to participate for two years due to the 
deterioration of the tuberculosis that was soon to take his life, he was 
clearly the figure who directly inspired the group. He gave public lec­
tures every Monday night, and soon after his death, the fledgling move­
ment began a “back to Manshi” campaign.18 *
17 Yoshida, p. 150.
18 Yoshida gives a number of examples throughout his biography of Kiyozawa Man­
shi to explain the decline of the movement after Kiyozawa’s death until its own extinc­
tion in the 1920’s.
** Translated by Bando ShOjun, “The Great Path of Absolute Other Power’’ and 
“My Faith,” in The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 5, no. 2 (October 1972), pp. 141-152.
His attempts at reforming his church having run their course, 
Kiyozawa at this time settled down in an attempt to forge his ideas into 
a social pragmatic for the intellectual society of his time. For the 
KOkOdO the message of seishinshugi was that “perfect freedom,” de­
fined as spiritual in nature and thereby devoid of social conflict, was at­
tainable through diligent asceticism and study. By this late stage in 
Kiyozawa’s relatively short life, his “conversion to tariki” is well at­
tested, especially in his famous essay entitled “Waga Shinnen,” or 
“My Faith,” where he attributes all his accomplishments to the work 
of the Tathagata.” Nevertheless, in explaining seishinshugi, Kiyozawa 
does not profess pantheistic beliefs; in fact he is rather critical of the 
other Buddhist leaders who have blurred the distinction between sacred 
and profane. In his lambasting of what he considered the overly 
secularized Buddhism of Inoue Enryfi, Murakami Senshd, and Naka- 
nishi GorO, he expresses a theme we will examine below in some detail, 
namely, that religion has intrinsic value and only suffers when judged 
by nonreligious standards:
“When reaching an understanding that religion occupies a different 
kind of locale outside any benefit to society or ethical action, one has 
then taken a step within it and no longer sees any need to evaluate 
religion from outside of it. This is the proper standpoint of seishin­
shugi. Therefore, rejecting external standards, seishinshugi bases its
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standards internally; without affixing our gaze on objective structures, 
we hold the subjective mental states to be essential. At times this may 
mean subjectivism, at other times it may mean introspective analy­
sis.”20
20 From a speech given in 1901 to the 14th Summer Seminar of the Kansai Associa­
tion of Buddhist Youth; cf. Yoshida, pp. 159-60.
21 Nihon BukkyQshi: Kindai Kinseihen, vol. Ill, eds. Ienaga Saburd, Tamamuro 
Taisei et al. (Kyoto: Hozdkan, 1967), p. 276.
22 Chiefly due to the influence of ltd Hirobumi, who saw in Buddhism a conservative 
force of no small potential benefit to the political goals of expanded capitalism at home 
and imperialism abroad.
Before we discuss Kiyozawa’s ideas on religion and ethics, let us first 
take a look at the philosophical currents in society that may have in­
fluenced his views. We know that as the Neo-Confucian influence upon 
Tokugawa rulers grew, Buddhism was increasingly looked upon with 
rancor by the secular establishment in the late Edo period. The Mito 
school, which played a major role in the revolution leading to the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868, often made Buddhism the scapegoat for the na­
tion’s economic shortcomings. In one case of Mito school influence, 
the regional daimyo of Satsuma during the 1850s, Shimazu Nariakira, 
announced a plan to melt down all Buddhist bells under his control for 
the manufacture of guns and ammunition. As fate would have it, he 
died before he could carry this out and the policy was discontinued.21 
The first year of the Meiji Restoration saw an official policy enacted in 
which Shinto shrines were to be purged of all Buddhist elements, reflect­
ing the Mito ideology that blended Shinto nationalism and Neo-Confu- 
cianist feudalists loyalty. This policy included everything from remov­
ing all Buddhist art from Shinto shrines and Buddhist words from the 
names of Shinto deities (and the shrines themselves) to forced laiciza- 
tion of Buddhist monks living in Shinto establishments. Known today 
as “haibutsu kishaku” this policy of oppression probably was
aimed more at the restoring of prestige and power to the emperor and 
the Shinto myth surrounding the imperial family than the goal of purg­
ing Japan of all Buddhist influence; its social impact upon the sangha 
was nevertheless of major proportions. In the 1890s the government 
relaxed its attack,22 and by the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, every 
established Buddhist sect had become supportive of the military incur-
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sion into Manchuria, displaying an eagerness to affirm their chauvin­
ism by willingly sending clergy as chaplains to the war front.23 By now 
the sangha was expected to provide an ethic for the nation by uphold­
ing both the morality of the Imperial Rescript on Education and the 
materialistic optimism of modern capitalism.24 25The psychological trau­
ma experienced during the first 35 years of Meiji by the Buddhist world 
in Japan is an area deserving far greater study.
23 Ajia BukkyOshi—Nihonhen VIII: Kindai BukkyO, eds. Nakamura Hajime, 
Kasahara Kazuo, Kanaoka Hidetomo (Kosei Shuppansha, 1972), vol. VII.
24 Buddhist monks at this time had to be examined and approved by the Ministry of 
Education before they were allowed to serve as school teachers to children.
25 “Kindai BukkyO ni okeru Rinri to ShakyOsei ni tsuite” (“Ethics and Religiosity 
in Modem Buddhism”) by Ikeda Eishun, in Nihon ni okeru Rinri to ShQkyO, ed. by 
Shimode Sekiyo (Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1980), p. 249.
M Enlightenment thinkers in Meiji Japan have been criticized for generally remain­
ing essentially political in their outlook, resulting in a lack of concern for the in­
dividual internalization and corresponding value shift that took place in Europe. It is 
not surprising that most of these Enlightenment ethics were, however deep their under­
standing, unable to withstand the same ethical politicization that Japan has undergone 
for most of its history.
As if this was not enough, Western Enlightenment thinkers in Japan, 
strongly influenced by John Stuart Mill and Herbert Spencer, also 
seemed to possess an inexhaustible supply of ideological ammunition 
to hurl at Buddhism. Buddhism was frequently derided for holding 
that passions led to suffering and depravity; instead the Japanese were 
urged to accept the “modern” notion that the passions were at the very 
core of so-called natural human rights. Some even claimed that the 
more civilized nations of the world achieved their status at least partly 
because they displayed greater passion than their backward neigh­
bors!23 To thinkers like Nishi Amane and Katd Hiroyuki, the Buddhist 
esteem of asceticism seemed to be holding the nation back from a Dar­
winian social evolution based on the pursuit of pleasure. It is probably 
safe to generalize here that most Japanese Enlightenment thinkers en­
couraged the growth of capitalism for its value of increasing the coun­
try’s strength, although they did raise arguments about the necessity of 
distinguishing between the Japanese “people” {minzoku and the 
Japanese “nation” (kokka one of the most fundamental issues 
of Japan’s modem political identity.26 The Protestant thinker, 
Tokutomi SohO, active in the democratic movement contemporary
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with Kiyozawa Manshi, wrote an essay entitled “Hiensei” SIKtt, “A 
Negation of Worldly Pessimism,” in which he rebuked Buddhism for 
its alienation from worldly concerns, and lamented Japan’s fate of 
historically accepting Buddhism because it impeded the growth of 
Japan’s capitalistic economy.27
27 Yoshida, p. 186.
28 This is not to say, however, that all Enlightenment and/or Christian thinkers were 
in unanimity on this point. Yoshida mentions (pp. 187-88) that the correspondence be­
tween Kiyozawa and Onishi Hajime, a Christian philosopher, shows the latter’s 
affirmation of ensei IRt*, “worldly pessimism,” as of primary importance to the 
strength of the Buddhist message.
” Nihon BukkyOshi, vol. Ill, p. 114.
50 “Shinrei no ShuyO; Ensei” (35), vol. 6, p. 321 ff.
The charge of misanthropy came not only from capitalists, but 
socialists (many of whom were Christians) as well.28 Undaunted, Bud­
dhist sectarian establishments continued to operate a system of ascetic 
discipline based on world renunciation. Yet in the later Meiji period in­
dividuals did emerge who, unable to ignore the political pressure, 
began to speak out in an effort to reconcile Buddhist renunciation 
(shukke with the sociopolitical demands of an ethic pursuing 
economic and military expansion. Perhaps the best known of the 
apologists was Inoue Enryo, who argued that Buddhist culture had 
made significant contributions to the Japanese nation in the past and 
should not be seen as an obstacle to its development in the future.29
But, for Kiyozawa Manshi, people like Inoue Enryo typified the 
morass of his church—i.e., people with a shallow understanding of 
Buddhism expressing positions based more on feelings of nationalism 
than any philosophical conclusion or religious experience. Kiyozawa 
himself had definite opinions about this question of rapprochement be­
tween Buddhism and Japan’s social and political ideals: “If we can 
agree that life, property, power and fame are worldly dharmas (i.e., 
elements, issues), then it is clear that for anyone seeking freedom, dis­
dain for the world is essential.”30
Yet as much as Kiyozawa affirmed the importance of worldly 
pessimism, he equally opposed the traditional Buddhist path of renun­
ciation. His resolution of this apparent conflict stems from his ideas 
about the relationship of religion and ethics. Kiyozawa realized that, at 
least in the case of Buddhism, flight to a monastic community merely
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meant substituting the ethical system of the monastery for that of soci­
ety; it did not solve the issue of how ethics and religion should be 
viewed vis-fc-vis each other. He instead focused on the fact that all 
ethical systems were based on social and psychological expediencies, 
hence transient and moreover impossible to live by. Religious truths, 
on the other hand, should be transhistorical as they are universal and 
atemporal. One should be involved with the issues of society, but in­
wardly maintain a calm, focused demeanor. Kiyozawa’s term for this 
was ‘externally a layman, internally a monastic’ (jgaizpku naisO 
fit).31
” “Hojazam” vol. 5, p. 8ff.
In order to understand Kiyozawa’s writings on the imperative of 
discriminating religion from ethics, one must first be familiar with the 
implications of the Mahayana Buddhist doctrinal concept of absolute 
and worldly truth. Absolute truth (S., paramart ha) is infinite, tran­
scendent, and noncontextual; worldly truth (samvrti) manifesting in 
specific circumstances that color its meaning, is the truth we come to 
know as conceivable. From a political point of view, a somewhat 
secularized notion of worldly truth is open to manipulation by authori­
ty. This is precisely what has happened throughout the history of Bud­
dhism in East Asia and Tibet, where sutras were regularly chanted and 
even created expressly for the protection of the state and at times 
emperors even declared themselves Bodhisattvas (J. gongen fefft), fus­
ing their political and religious authority. No less was this true in Meiji 
Japan, when, after the abandoning of the haibutsu kishaku policy, the 
government quickly found support among the established Buddhist 
sects for a new spirit of reintegration.
For Kiyozawa, this was clearly a travesty of Buddhist samvrti ethics, 
however old this history of cooperation in Japan. Although he could 
have argued for a separation of church and state based upon his studies 
in the early A gam a sutras, Kiyozawa instead brought forth an in­
teresting analysis in terms of Shinshfi theology. Here is one presenta­
tion of it:
“In general, when one compares worldly truth and morality, or 
worldly and the nation-state (kokka), one should lay out the qualities 
of each of them. First of all, concerning worldly truth and morality, 
one must know what is meant by worldly. Upon trying to explain this,
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one immediately notices that worldly stands alongside absolute truth as 
part of the doctrine of tariki Shinshu. In other words, it is not a 
teaching of morality but a teaching of religion; it is not a teaching 
about the path of men but about the path of Buddhas. Seeing this, it 
goes without saying that worldly truth is something to be explained by 
a religious person, and that its goal must be to produce religious 
results. On the other hand, morality is morality, not religion; it is a 
teaching of the way of men, not the way of Buddhas. Hence, it is 
something that should be expounded by a moralist, and its goal must 
be to produce moral results. Although politicians do not avoid speak­
ing about business matters, politicians are not merchants.”32
12 “ShQkyOteki Dotoku (Zokutai) to FutsQ DOtoku to no KOshO" (“The Relation­
ship between Religious Morality and Ordinary Morality”), vol. 6, p. 212. This essay, 
Kiyozawa’s last, will be carried in a future issue of this journal.
” Vol. 6, p. 374ff. The other two arguments run as follows: (1) Religion is required 
as a means to restrain the masses, i.e., the real purpose of religion is ethics. (2) Religion 
and ethics amount to the same thing since our main focus should be on practicing vir­
tue and public good through judgements made of free will. This practice may be called 
either religion or ethics (depending on the situation).
54 The two poles in this argument I have rendered rational and superrational follow­
ing Kiyozawa’s use of the unusual word chOri to designate non-rational elements
Elsewhere, in his essay entitled “ShakyO to Rinri to no SOkan" 
(The Correlation between Religion and Ethics), Kiyo­
zawa attacks three standard arguments traditionally offered for the 
unitary view of religion and ethics. These are too lengthy to explain in 
detail here, but in his rebuttal to the first argument, a crucial element 
of his own thesis on the disestablishment of religion and ethics is ex­
pressed which deserves exposition. It concerns the danger of overra­
tionalizing the irrational. The first argument states the “unitary” posi­
tion in which religion and ethics were completely fused in ancient 
times, merely discriminating a rational dimension of this unified whole 
as ethical and an irrational one as religious; through time the ethical 
split off from the religious and exists today in a thoroughly rationalized 
format.33 Kiyozawa then raises the following issue:
“We then must ask why present day ethics were once ancient 
religion. The answer to this would have to be based on human in­
telligence. For today human intelligence has developed such that we 
have rational ethics, but in ancient times we had superrational34
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religion because of a lack of such development. We have two questions 
that must be raised at this point: 1) If we take what may be rational to­
day and determine that it was something superrational in the past, then 
can we not assume that what is superrational today may one day very 
well become something rational? 2) Does not this imply, then, that 
what was valued for its efficacy as superrational in the past has lost that 
value today?
4‘Thus we have come to the point where for some people what is ra­
tional today is sufficient by itself, and there is no need whatsoever for 
anything superrational. And the amount [or degree] of which some­
thing is either rational or superrational is, from all points of views, 
still something acceptable as rationalized. We may reach a point where 
there is no need for the superrational, and yet we don’t know how to 
judge the degree of this. Probably in the end, we will never be able to 
establish such judgements, . . . [hence] like in ancient times the super- 
rational is a necessity for us today. . . . Thus we have no choice but 
to establish both religion and ethics. And from all points of view they 
cannot be undifferentiated.”35
instead of the common word for irrational, higOri The prefix cho- here com­
monly means “trans-” as in “transcend” (chOetsu tag?) or “super-” as in “super­
natural” (chOshizen
” Vol. 6, pp. 375-76.
What Kiyozawa is reminding us of here is how the value of the sa­
cred as sacred is weakened when it is subsumed by the profane, which 
in this case means social ethics. Kiyozawa’s rhetoric betrays his deep 
concern for the necessity of maintaining religious values as such, fear­
ing that any amalgamation of religion and ethics weakens the sig­
nificance of each. Above he expresses the importance of perceiving 
religious issues as religious, clearly his overriding concern in this mat­
ter. But elsewhere, Kiyozawa also elucidates the contrary case, i.e., 
how religion as authority can corrupt ethics and morals. In his efforts 
to distinguish Buddhist morality from other belief systems which use ex­
ternal pressure to influence behavior, he notes the following:
“In other words, because the arbitrary thought-construction, ‘you 
must do this, you must not do that’, is added to the arbitrary abstrac­
tions of ordinary morality where one is merely ordered to ‘do this, 
don’t do that*, one thinks of the situation as one in which a solemn
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command has come down from God or Buddha saying, ‘you absolute­
ly must do this*, or ‘it is forbidden for you to do that*. Accordingly, 
people come to think that the crucial matter of their salvation will de­
pend upon their ability or lack of it to execute moral behavior. . . . 
Hence, it is natural that an extreme anxiety develops regarding one’s 
ability to behave appropriately.”36
The issue of “appropriate moral behavior” is a central one in 
Kiyozawa’s understanding of the spiritual significance of worldly truth 
(samvrti), although not in the usual sense. Here it must be seen in terms 
of the phrase quoted above, “the goal [of worldly truth) must be to pro­
duce religious results.” Instead of extolling the merits of living by 
moral standards, Kiyozawa instead focuses on the spiritual significance 
of the existential dilemma arising when we face the fact that ultimately 
we can never really execute “appropriate moral behavior,” or as he suc­
cinctly puts it, “Knowing we must practice ethics, why are we unable to 
perfect this?”37 Kiyozawa’s answer is, again, thoroughly Buddhist: “It 
must be because of the profound existence of the so-called habits and 
inherent tendencies in each one of us.”38 In other words, our mental 
afflictions, the core cause of human suffering in Buddhism, are no less 
relevant to the anguish we feel about our inability to lead morally 
perfect lives than they are to our struggle for spiritual liberation. Utiliz­
ing the Shinshu concepts of jiriki and tariki, Kiyozawa labels the attach­
ment to social and philosophical norms as “jiriki ethics,” i.e., goal- 
oriented, ambitious and futile. Ethical concern itself, however, is never 
slighted in Kiyozawa’s work: “The person who has attained a religious 
perspective inevitably realizes how imperative it is to uphold ethics. So 
saying this, we can state that those who do not perceive the importance 
of ethics have not yet entered into a religious perspective.”39 But the 
anxiety over the failure to easily establish ethical norms that are just 
and workable is an important lesson for Kiyozawa about the limits 
of our rationality. In this, as in his eschewing of the benefits of 
materialistic culture and any optimism about political reform, 
Kiyozawa remains a sort of “inner-worldly ascetic” (Weber), simply
56 ibid., pp. 221-22.
r ibid., p. 388.
M ibid.
* ibid., p. 378.
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because, in his case, he denies the objective value of human percep­
tion.40 Finding a purpose to this ethical impossibility, Kiyozawa 
reaches the following conclusion:
40 Interestingly, in his essay entitled “Kojin to Shakai no Kankei" (“The Relation­
ship of the Individual and Society”) published in 1897, Kiyozawa suggests the optimal 
social structure for Japan would be a model incorporating both Individualism and 
Socialism. Yet, just one year later, his romance with left-wing ideology seems to have 
gone awry, for in his article entitled “Kojin to Shakaishugi” (“The Individual and 
Socialism”), he is openly antagonistic to what he sees as the potential in Socialism to 
become another political system wherein the state has precedence to the point that it in­
hibits individual cultivation through self-reflection.
41 Vol. 6, pp. 218-19.
“The intent of the worldly truth teaching of ShinshO does not lie in 
seeking success in the area of its execution . . . [it] does not aim at the 
usual goal of competency in the execution [of the teaching] such that 
we perform a creditable or splendid deed. ... In that case, just where 
does the objective of ShinshU’s worldly truth lie? Its aim, in fact, is to 
lead one to the perception that one cannot perform these moral tasks. . . . 
For the most basic impediment blocking the entrance to tariki faith is 
the thought that one is able to practice jiriki discipline. Although there 
are many kinds of y/r/Ari-disciplined practice, the most common are our 
acts of ethics and morality. While thinking one’s moral behavior can 
be carried out commendably, it is ultimately impossible to enter into 
tariki religion.”41
Kiyozawa Manshi thus affirms the paradoxical conclusion that the 
purpose of Buddhist morality is to teach us that we are incapable of liv­
ing by it. Although he is nowhere explicit about which moral systems 
he includes in “ordinary morality” (does it include the morality of 
other religions?), his assumption that Buddhist ethics are somehow uni­
que in their self-negating premise, in fact, clearly violates their original 
intent. The ethical and moral values of early Buddhism directly 
reflected a conception of self-development through discipline and in­
sight marked by demarcated stages along a spiritual path of achieve­
ment (S. mOrga) and there is no doubt Kiyozawa knew of this. The 
concept of the mQrga is the essence of jiriki Buddhism; but through the 
Shinshfl theological perspective, Kiyozawa came to the realization that 
“it is actually an indispensable condition for becoming religious that 
one (experiences) the perception that when one honestly seeks to per-
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form actions as per ethics or morality, in the end things do not go as 
one thought they would.”42 This is an interesting conclusion given its 
historical context. But it also suggests to us the general premise that, in 
order to thrive, religion requires moral paradox if not moral failure of 
its own values.
42 ibid.
45 Cf. "Hon*i Honbun no Jikaku" vol. 6, p. 476ff.; •• WagO no Kokoro” vol. 6, p. 
273ff.; and "Zaiaku ShOji no Bonbu.”
In the Seishinshugi movement during his final years, Kiyozawa 
presents us with a rare combination of extreme individualism yet near 
total self-effacement. His repeated rejection of the politicized values of 
both secular and sacred society reveals a world of Buddhism significant­
ly different from the vast majority of politically and socially accom­
modating Buddhist thinkers of his day. On the one hand he claims that 
our belief in God is not because He exists, rather He exists because we 
believe in Him. On the other, his extreme humility in essays like 
“ Waga Shinnen” gives credit for all his achievements to the Tathigata 
(Amitabha). Ethically, he keeps returning to the same point: good and 
evil are relative concepts, yet individuals set themselves up as ethical ar­
biters. And excluding those few who are enlightened, everyone’s judge­
ment is impaired by previous experience (karma) and personal aspira­
tion. In an age when the scientific method had just emerged as the 
efficient means for rationalizing an ordered society, Kiyozawa wrote 
essays like, “We must free ourselves from the misconceptions of objec­
tivism” (“Kyakkanshugi no heisha o dakkyaku subesh?'
Some of his most moving language can be seen in his 
writings on the social theory of “survival of the fittest” which glorifies 
competition as a healthy imperative for “progress” of the human 
race.* 45 Here he concludes that we should reject the premise of regard­
ing others as being in competition and thereby in opposition with us, 
but instead as Buddhas to be cherished and respected. On this point, 
one might argue that Shinran’s idea of akunin shokiy i.e., that it is bad 
people who awaken to faith the easiest (because of their minimal jiriki 
interference), already precludes social Darwinism from ShinshU 
theology. But Kiyozawa took this a step further by affirming that the 
concept of “bad people” is largely a question of social class, and that 
thieves and murderers are not necessarily evil at all. In other words.
78
KIYOZAWA MANSHI AND BUDDHIST ETHICS 
liberation has nothing to do with good and evil; the real issue is ig­
norance and all of us are equally ignorant in spiritual matters, he 
reminds us, even scholars, whom he criticizes for their nonpragmatic 
“research Buddhism” (kenkyQ bukkyO Wft&ft).44
44 Cf. Yoshida, pp. 16-17.
45 The last of the three historical periods of Buddhist teachings before the coming of 
the next historical Buddha, Maitreya. As much as 1400 years before Kiyozawa’s 
lifetime, many Buddhists in East Asia believed that so much time had passed since the 
historical Buddha had explained the truth that this third period had begun, and it was 
therefore now impossible for anyone to attain Buddhahood in this corrupt world by 
their own efforts.
44 Yoshida, p. 17.
47 “Seishinshugi to SeijO” in Seishinkai, vol. 1, no. 2; cf. Yoshida, p. 195.
Everyone feels some imperative to lead an ethical life-style, whether 
he is expressly religious or not. But Kiyozawa questions any idea of the 
perfectibility of man, or even the optimism that man’s condition 
spiritually and emotionally will improve with the social progress of 
modem society as measured by increased democracy and a growing 
material standard of living. There is an apparent paradox here because 
as a Buddhist, Kiyozawa stands in one of the few religious traditions 
that does affirm the potential of each person to attain the spiritual 
status commensurate with the founder of the faith. Certainly relevant 
here is the notion of mappo ft,45 and perhaps we should perceive 
Kiyozawa as a modem interpreter of mappo for the twentieth century. 
In any case, he seems to be trying to tell us that all spiritual attainment, 
laying aside the question of perfectibility, must pass through, if not 
be based upon, a realization that all judgements of human behavior 
spring from a consciousness that is egocentric and severely impaired 
by ignorance, misconceptions, misperceptions, prejudices, etc. This 
is what he means by jiriki ethics. It is important to remember that 
Kiyozawa does not seek to purge all notion of ethics from our lives, 
both externally and internally. Rather he strives to offer a means to 
alleviate “those pains unrelieved by morality.”46 Another way of say­
ing this, to borrow a phrase from his disciple, Akegarasu Haya, is that 
morality and ethics can create a significant obstacle to spiritual pro­
gress by fostering an attitude of smugness and complacency in those 
who feel they are obeying the rules and therefore profess “to have no 
guilt about their actions.”47
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We may now be able to trace the three basic textual sources of 
Kiyozawa’s thought on religion and ethics. From the Agamas, the 
earliest strand of Buddhist literature, comes the fundamental issue for 
all Buddhist thinkers: ignorance pervades everything we think or do 
and there is no way of trusting our judgements until ignorance is totally 
eliminated. From the Stoic philosopher Epictetus derives the convic­
tion that the focus of one’s practice must be on one’s own mind, as 
well as perhaps the Socratic tradition in which ethics must be linked to 
knowledge. Finally, from Shinran stems the sophisticated argument 
combining jiriki and tariki with the two truths theory of Mahayana 
Buddhism.
It can probably be argued that Kiyozawa Manshi addressed the ques­
tion of religion and ethics from a religious point of view because for 
him the central issue was how to preserve the supra-rational nature of 
religious experience without succumbing to ethical rationalization. 
Edward Shils’ comment that “the more successful [rationalization] 
becomes, the more it endangers itself, the more it lays itself open to 
resistance,”48 was made nearly eighty years after Kiyozawa’s death, 
yet I think it affords an insight into the ethicoreligious polarity as 
Kiyozawa saw it. The point here is simply that it is reasonable to see 
movements like Seishinshugi emerging as idealistic shelters against the 
storm of politically rationalized ethics pervading Japan at the dawn of 
its modem imperialistic era. Kiyozawa and others no doubt were keen­
ly aware of the spiritual weakness of sectarian Buddhism revealed 
when its political ostracism in the early Meiji period produced apolo­
getics and compromise instead of acceptance of its isolation as an op­
portunity to strengthen its message. Kiyozawa’s refusal to take stands 
on specific ethical issues makes it hard to see him as a philosopher; yet 
as a religious figure he eludes Weber’s categorization as either ascetic 
or mystic.49 However enigmatic we may regard Kiyozawa Manshi, for
48 Tradition, by Edward Shils (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press: 1981), p. 316.
49 Weber’s typology can be found in his essay translated as “Religious Rejections of 
the World and Their Directions,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds. Gertz 
and Mills, pp. 322-59. Briefly, the active ascetic is defined as one who participates in 
the world as God’s tool, seeking to tame what is “creatural and wicked” either in the 
external world or within himself. Mysticism instead implies a passive attitude to 
become a “vessel of the divine,” for “the creature must be silent so that God may
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someone living at a time when the powerful elements of society were 
remarkably successful in spreading a uniform social ethic, his struggle 
to retrieve spirituality from what he considered the transient thorough­
fare of ethical norms may truly be called heroic. And the persistence of 
the myth of social homogeneity among the Japanese people only magni­
fies the relevance of his thought today.
speak.” Kiyozawa cannot be seen as a mystic either of contemplative flight from the 
world or of the inner-worldly type because there is no trace of consciously imposed 
passivity in his concept of tariki. Active, disciplined meditative practice is of the ut­
most importance to Kiyozawa, yet he neither seeks to master the world as a ‘‘rationally 
active ascetic,” nor sees a need for avoiding any activity in the orders of the world 
(asceticist flight from the world). In short, Kiyozawa rejects both renunciation as well 
any escape from practicing self-cultivation. The traditional Buddhist monastic would 
probably fit into the “asceticist flight from the world” category, but ShinshO has 
struggled to bring Buddhist asceticism back into society without the notion of at­
tempting to control its direction away from evil.
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